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Accuracy and evidence∗
Richard Pettigrew†
Abstract
In ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce argues
that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus
by showing that, if they don’t, there will be alternative credences that
are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accu-
racy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of match-
ing one’s credences to one’s evidence. I will consider four ways in
which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the norms
to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of
credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal
that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of
credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential
goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value,
but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal
is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of
accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise
are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate
and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces
to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just
the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems
for Joyce’s argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the
latter.
Jim Joyce has argued that our credences should obey the axioms of the
probability calculus by showing that, if they don’t, there will be alternative
credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours [Joyce, 1998].
But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also
the goal of matching one’s credences to one’s evidence. I will consider
four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, the
∗I am indebted to Kenny Easwaran, Branden Fitelson, Jim Joyce, Jason Konek, and Ben
Levinstein, as well as three anonymous referees for this journal for useful discussion of
earlier versions of this paper.
†Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, UK. BS6 6JL.
Email: Richard.Pettigrew@bris.ac.uk.
1
norms to which this goal gives rise act as ‘side constraints’ on our choice of
credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is
weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences,
so that one might trade off the evidential goal against the goal of accuracy
in the service of obtaining greater overall cognitive value; on the third, as
on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of
accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable, so
they cannot be weighed against one another; on the fourth, the evidential
goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of
accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are
pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there
is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The
fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being
accurate; any norms that seem to follow from the evidential goal in fact
follow from the goal of accuracy. The pluralist positions lead to problems
for Joyce’s argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter.
1 Joyce’s argument for Probabilism
We represent an agent’s cognitive state at a given time by her credence func-
tion at that time: this is the function c that takes each proposition about
which the agent has an opinion and returns the real number that measures
her degree of belief or credence in that proposition. By convention, we repre-
sent minimal credence by 0 and maximal credence by 1. Thus, c is defined
on the set F of propositions about which the agent has an opinion; and it
takes values in [0, 1]. If X is in F , then c(X) is our agent’s degree of be-
lief or credence in X. Throughout, we assume that F is finite. With this
framework in hand, we can state the norm of Probabilism:
Probabilism At any time in an agent’s credal life, it ought to be
the case that her credence function c at that time is a probability
function.1
How do we establish this norm? Jim Joyce offers the following argument:
It is often said that the aim of full belief is truth. One way to make this pre-
cise is to say that the ideal doxastic state is that in which one believes every
1If F is an algebra and c : F → [0, 1], then c is a probability function if
(i) c(⊥) = 0 and c(>) = 1.
(ii) c(A ∨ B) = c(A) + c(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive.
If F is not an algebra and c : F → [0, 1], then c is a probability function if it can be extended
to a probability function over an algebra that contains F .
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true proposition about which one has an opinion, and one disbelieves ev-
ery false proposition about which one has an opinion. That is, the ideal
doxastic state is the omniscient doxastic state (relative to the set of proposi-
tions about which one has an opinion). We might then measure how good
an agent’s doxastic state is by its proximity to this omniscient state.2
Joyce’s argument—as I will present it—is based on an analogous claim
about credences. We say that the ideal credal state is that in which our agent
assigns credence 1 to each true proposition inF and credence 0 to each false
proposition in F . By analogy with the doxastic case, we might call this the
omniscient credal state (relative to the set of propositions about which she
has an opinion). LetWF be the set of possible worlds relative to F : that is,
the set of consistent assignments of truth values to the propositions in F .
Now, let w be a world inWF . Then let vw be the omniscient credal state at
w: that is,
vw(X) :=
{
0 if X is false at w
1 if X is true at w
We then measure how good an agent’s credal state is by its proximity to
the omniscient state. Following Joyce, we call this the gradational accuracy
of the credal state (or, to abbreviate, its accuracy). To do this, we need a
measure of distance between credence functions. Many different measures
will do the job, but here I will focus on the most popular, namely, Squared
Euclidean Distance. Suppose c and c′ are two credence functions. Then
define the Squared Euclidean Distance between them as follows (‘Q’ stands
for ‘quadratic’):
Q(c, c′) := ∑
X∈F
(c(X)− c′(X))2
That is, to obtain the distance between c and c′, we consider each propo-
sition X in F on which they are defined; we take the difference between
the credences they assign to X; we square that difference; and we sum the
results. Thus, given a possible world w in WF , the cognitive badness or
disvalue of the credence function c at w is given by its inaccuracy; that is,
the distance between c and vw, namely, Q(c, vw). We call this the Brier score
of c at w, and we write it B(c, w). So the cognitive value of c at w is the neg-
ative of the Brier score of c at w; that is, it is −B(c, w). Thus, B is a measure
of inaccuracy; −B is a measure of accuracy.
With this measure of cognitive value in hand, Joyce argues for Proba-
bilism by appealing to a standard norm of traditional decision theory:
2See [Easwaran, ms] for a fascinating description of the consequences of such an account
of full beliefs.
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Dominance SupposeO is a set of options,W is a set of possible
worlds, and U is a measure of the value of the options in O at
the worlds inW . Suppose o, o′ in O. Then we say that
(a) o strongly U-dominates o′ if U(o′, w) < U(o, w) for all worlds
w inW
(b) o weakly U-dominates o′ if U(o′, w) ≤ U(o, w) for all worlds
w in W and U(o′, w) < U(o, w) for at least one world w in
W .
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o strongly U-dominates o′;
(ii) There is no o′′ in O that weakly U-dominates o.
Then o′ is irrational.
Of course, in standard decision theory, the options are practical actions be-
tween which we wish to choose. For instance, they might be the various
environmental policies that a government could pursue; or they might be
the medical treatments that a doctor may recommend. But there is no rea-
son why Dominance or any other decision-theoretic norm can only deter-
mine the irrationality of such options. They can equally be used to establish
the irrationality of accepting a particular scientific theory or, as we will see,
the irrationality of particular credal states. When they are put to use in the
latter way, the options are the possible credal states an agent might adopt;
the worlds are, as above, the consistent assignments of truth values to the
propositions in F ; and the measure of value is−B, the negative of the Brier
score. Granted that, which credal states does Dominance rule out? As the
following theorem shows, it is precisely those that violate Probabilism.
Theorem 1 For all credence functions c:
(I) If c is not a probability function, then there is a credence function c∗ that is a
probability function such that c∗ strongly Brier dominates c.
(II) If c is a probability function, then there is no credence function c∗ such c∗
weakly Brier dominates c.
This, then, is Joyce’s argument for Probabilism:
(1) The cognitive value of a credence function is given by its proximity to
the ideal credence function:
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(i) The ideal credence function at world w is vw.
(ii) Distance is measured by the Squared Euclidean Distance.
Thus, the cognitive value of a credence function at a world is given by
the negative of its Brier score at that world.
(2) Dominance
(3) Theorem 1
Therefore,
(4) Probabilism
In fact, Joyce weakens (1)(ii) and thus strengthens the argument [Joyce, 1998,
§4]. But that is not relevant for our purposes, so we leave it as it is.
2 Alethic goals and evidential goals
In the remainder of the paper, I wish to consider the following sort of objec-
tion to Joyce’s argument: Joyce’s argument seems to rely on the assumption
that the only epistemic virtue is accuracy, or proximity to the omniscient
credences; but, one might think, there is at least one other epistemic virtue,
namely, the virtue of matching one’s credences to one’s evidence. That is,
Joyce’s argument appeals only to the alethic goal of credences, namely, the
goal of getting closer to the omniscient credences; but there is also an ev-
idential goal, namely, the goal of proportioning belief to evidence. Thus,
this objection runs, Joyce’s argument for Probabilism is flawed in the way
that a scientist’s reasoning is flawed if she argues for her favoured hypoth-
esis by pointing out only that it is simpler than all existing rivals. Since
there are scientific virtues other than simplicity, her argument holds little
weight. Similarly, the objection goes, Joyce’s argument holds little weight,
since it appeals only to the virtue of accuracy when there are other rel-
evant virtues. This objection was considered and quickly dismissed in
[Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010, 244-5]; it was stated with much greater force
and precision in [Easwaran and Fitelson, 2012]. I follow Easwaran and Fi-
telson in calling it the evidentialist objection.
In what follows, I will consider four views of the evidential goal of cre-
dences: the Side Constraints View; the Competing Virtues View; the Incompara-
ble Virtues View; and the Reductive View. On the Side Constraints View, the
goal of matching the evidence trumps all other goals. That is, there is no
trade-off between the extent to which one achieves that goal and the extent
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to which one achieves another goal, such as the alethic goal: no proximity
to the alethic goal can ever justify deviation from the evidential goal. In this
respect, it is quite unlike the way in which scientific virtues are treated: in
that situation, even empirical adequacy is not treated as a side constraint.
Thus, as its name suggests, the Side Constraints View is analogous to cer-
tain Kantian or rights-based views in ethics in which the categorical im-
perative or certain basic rights behave as side constraints in any moral
decision-making; they cannot be trumped by consequentialist considera-
tions. The Competing Virtues View, on the other hand, is closer to (certain
sorts of) consequentialism. On this view, the degree to which the evidential
goal is achieved is weighed against the degree to which the alethic goal is
achieved to give the overall cognitive value of the credences in question.
The Incomparable Virtues View is akin to a view in ethics on which the
utilities of individual agents are incomparable. On this view, it is valuable
to be accurate and it is valuable to respect one’s evidence. But these values
are incomparable; they cannot be combined to give an overall cognitive
value, and they cannot be weighed against one another. Finally, the Re-
ductive View resembles hedonistic versions of utilitarianism in ethics. On
this view, the evidential goal is eliminated, just as the talk of rights and the
categorical imperative is eliminated in hedonistic utilitarianism. The only
virtue is accuracy, just as for the utilitarians, the only virtue is high hedo-
nistic utility. Any norm that might initially seem to follow from the virtue
of matching credences to the evidence is instead derived from the virtue of
accuracy, just as the utilitarian might attempt to recover certain norms that
seem to follow from rights or from the categorical imperative.
I will argue that the Side Constraints View, the Competing Virtues View,
and the Incomparable Virtues View create insurmountable problems for
Joyce’s argument for Probabilism. But the Reductive View saves the argu-
ment. I endorse the Reductive View.
3 The Side Constraints View
Easwaran and Fitelson raise a powerful objection to Joyce’s argument based
on the Side Constraints View [Easwaran and Fitelson, 2012]. In this section,
I spell out their objection more fully; I consider an objection and rebut it.
Probabilism is a very general norm: it applies to any agent at any time
in her credal life. Thus, if it is to work, Joyce’s argument for that norm
must apply to any agent at any time. Easwaran and Fitelson object that it
doesn’t. Consider the following agent:
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Taj Taj has opinions about only two propositions, X and ¬X.
Her credence function is c(X) = 0.6, c(¬X) = 0.6.
According to Joyce’s argument, Taj is irrational because there are credal
states that strongly accuracy dominate hers and that are not themselves
weakly accuracy dominated: for instance, c∗(X) = 0.5, c∗(¬X) = 0.5, as
Figure 1 illustrates.
However, suppose that Taj knows that the chance of X is 0.6—and sup-
pose that she does not thereby know that the chance of ¬X is 0.4. Suppose,
moreover, that she knows nothing more. Then, according to another norm
that governs credences, David Lewis’ Principal Principle, our agent ought
to have credence 0.6 in X [Lewis, 1980]:3
Principal Principle If an agent knows that the chance of X is r,
and nothing more, then she ought to have c(X) = r.
Now, as Figure 1 makes clear, while Taj’s current credence function satisfies
Principal Principle, none of the credences that dominate it do. Thus, while
c is strongly dominated by c∗, and c∗ is not weakly dominated by anything,
c∗ is ruled out because it violates Principal Principle. This, Easwaran and
Fitelson contend, blocks the application of dominance reasoning, and thus
the argument to Probabilism.
“Joyce’s argument tacitly presupposes that—for any incoherent
agent S with credence function b—some (coherent) functions b′
that [accuracy] dominate b are always ‘available’ as ‘permissi-
ble alternative credences’ for S.” [Easwaran and Fitelson, 2012,
430]
Thus, Easwaran and Fitelson seem to be proposing three things: first, we
need to weakenDominance to ensure that a dominated option is only ruled
out as irrational if it is dominated by another option that is both not itself
dominated and ‘available’ or a ‘permissible alternative’; second, they claim
that an evidential norm renders any credence function that violates it ‘un-
available’ or ‘impermissible’ in the sense relevant to the dominance norm;
and third, they claim that there are evidential norms—such as Principal
Principle—that permit incoherent credence functions that are dominated
3Note that this is the formulation of the Principal Principle to which Easwaran and Fitel-
son appeal. Lewis’ formulation is in terms of conditional probabilities and it applies only
to an agent’s initial credence function. Together with Conditionalization, it gives the norm
discussed here.
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vw2
vw1
B(c, w1)
B(c, w2)
0.6
c
c∗ c′
Figure 1: Since Taj has credences in only two propositions, we can represent
her credence function c—as well as the two omniscient credence functions
vw1 and vw2—by points on the Euclidean plane. On this representation, the
Brier score of c at vw1 , for instance, is the square of the Euclidean distance
between the points that represent them. The thick diagonal line represents
the credence functions that satisfy Probabilism; the dashed vertical line
represents the credences that satisfy the Principal Principle; and the grey
shaded area represents the credence functions that accuracy dominate c.
Joyce’s argument turns on the fact that the grey area and the thick line in-
tersect. Thus, there are probabilistic credence functions that accuracy dom-
inate c. Indeed, c∗ is such a credence function. Easwaran and Fitelson’s
objection turns on the fact that the shaded grey area and the dashed line do
not intersect. Thus, none of the credence functions that accuracy dominate
c satisfy the Principal Principle. Indeed, the only credence function that
satisfies Probabilism and the Principal Principle is c′(X) = 0.6, c′(X) = 0.4.
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only by credence functions that violate the norm.4 Here is the reformula-
tion of Dominance:
Dominance− Suppose O is a set of options,W is a set of possi-
ble worlds, and U is a measure of the value of the options in O
at the worlds inW . Suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o strongly dominates o′
(ii) There is no o′′ in O that weakly dominates o.
(iii) o is ‘available’ or ‘permissible’.
Then o′ is irrational.
IfDominance− is the strongest norm in the vicinity, and if evidential norms
can indeed rule out credence functions as impermissible in the sense rele-
vant to Dominance−, then Joyce’s argument is blocked.
Easwaran and Fitelson’s argument is based on what I call the Side Con-
straints View of evidential norms. There is a clear analogy between this
view and Nozick’s appeal to side constraints in ethics [Nozick, 1974, Chap-
ter 3]. On Nozick’s view, we temper consequentialism by appealing to the
rights of the agents affected by our actions: these rights impose side con-
straints on action in much the same way that Easwaran and Fitelson claim
evidential norms impose side constraints on credence functions. Thus, in
the trolley problem, we might save five track workers by turning the trolley
and killing one of their co-workers, thereby causing a better (if nonetheless
still tragic) consequence. But, on Nozick’s view, we must not do that. The
dominating action in this case is ruled out because it violates the side con-
straints imposed by the rights of the co-worker.
Before moving on to the Competing Virtues View of evidential norms,
we stop to consider an objection to Easwaran and Fitelson’s argument. The
objection agrees with Easwaran and Fitelson that evidential norms impose
side constraints on our credences. And it agrees that any credence func-
tion that violates these side constraints is irrational. But it denies that they
are thereby impermissible in the sense relevant to Dominance−. Thus, on
this view, Dominance− and the evidential norms are distinct norms that
function entirely independently of one another. Dominance− rules out as
impermissible any option that is dominated by one that isn’t itself domi-
nated; and the evidential norms rule out anything that violates them. An
4It is this final claim with which Joyce takes issue [Joyce, ms]. He denies that there can be
such an evidential norm. If he is right, the evidentialist objection to the accuracy argument
for Probabilism is blocked. In this paper, I explore what can be said if, instead, Easwaran
and Fitelson are correct to say that Principal Principle is an evidential norm.
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option is then irrational if it is ruled out by one or by the other or by both.
Thus, in the case of Taj, the only credence function that isn’t ruled irrational
is c′(X) = 0.6, c′(¬X) = 0.4 (see Figure 1).
Admittedly, this account gives what we take to be the correct result in
the case of Taj: we agree that only c′ is rational. But it does not do so in
general. For instance, when this account of side constraints and dominance
norms is applied to the trolley problem, it rules out both actions—killing
one or letting five die—as impermissible: letting five die is dominated by
killing one; but killing one violates the side constraints. Thus, applied in
general, this account violates the meta-normative principle of ought-can:
no norm can rule out every option as irrational.
However, a deeper problem emerges when we see the effects of this ac-
count in cases such as Taj’s, where it does not violate ought-can. In her
situation, this account of how side constraints contribute to rational choice
renders c irrational, but it doesn’t render c′ irrational. However, if we com-
pare the features of c and c′, it isn’t clear what makes the latter better than
the former.
• c and c′ both satisfy the evidential side constraints.
• c is dominated, but only by options that violate the side constraints; c′ is
not dominated by any options.
• c′ is more inaccurate than c at w1 but less inaccurate than it at w2—i.e.
B(c′, w1) > B(c, w1) but B(c, w2) > B(c′, w2). Thus, c′ exposes the agent
to a risk of higher inaccuracy than c does; though it also presents the
possibility of lower inaccuracy.
So, to say that c′ is better than c in some sense strong enough to render
the latter irrational and not the former, the proponent of this account of
side constraints must say that being dominated is bad in itself and indeed
bad enough to render the risk of greater inaccuracy mandatory. And here
I think we come to the crux of the matter. Being dominated is not bad in
itself. The badness of being dominated depends on the status of the options
that do the dominating. To see this, consider our initial formulation of the
dominance norm as Dominance:
Dominance Suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o strongly dominates o′
(ii) There is no o′′ in O that weakly dominates o.
Then o′ is irrational.
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If being dominated were bad in itself, we needn’t have included condition
(ii). We might have strengthened Dominance by weakening (ii) to give:
(ii’) There is o′′ in O that is not weakly dominated by any option in O.
Call the resulting norm Dominance+. It obeys the ought-can principle; and
it treats being dominated as bad in itself. However, here is a counterexam-
ple to Dominance+:
• O = {o, o1, o2, o3, o4, . . .}
• W = {w1, w2}
U o o1 o2 o3 o4 . . . on . . .
w1 2 1 2 3 4 . . . n . . .
w2 2 1 2− 12 2− 14 2− 18 . . . 2− 12n−1 . . .
In this example, o is the only option that is not strongly dominated. But this
shouldn’t rule out the others as irrational. One way to see this is to observe
that, for each on (n ≥ 3), there is a non-extremal probability function that
assigns a greater expected utility to on than to o.
The lesson of this example is that what renders an option irrational is
being dominated by an option that isn’t itself then ruled out because it is also
dominated. o3 is dominated by each on (n > 3); but, since each on (n > 3) is
dominated by each om (m > n), this does not rule out o3 as irrational. Anal-
ogously, c shouldn’t be ruled out as irrational just because it is dominated;
after all, the options that dominate c are all themselves ruled out because
they violate the side constraints. This supports the move to Dominance−;
and it supports Easwaran and Fitelson’s contention that side constraints
rule out options as impermissible in the sense required byDominance−. Thus,
the objection is defeated and, on the Side Constraints View, Joyce’s argu-
ment is blocked.
4 The Competing Virtues View
In ethics and in epistemology, a side constraint is a constraint that must not
be violated no matter how much else of value could be acquired by doing
so. Thus, on the Side Constraints View of evidential norms, no gain in
accuracy however large could justify violating the Principal Principle. And
in ethics, Nozick must say that it is wrong to kill one to save any number
of others. In ethics, this is characteristic of Kantian views. The Competing
Virtues View of evidential norms, which we consider in this section, is,
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by contrast, analogous to a traditional sort of consequentialist view. On
such a view, while a person’s rights are important and it is valuable to
respect them, they are not inviolable: there are other sources of value—such
as pleasure, beauty, equality—and we might rationally choose to violate
a person’s rights in order to acquire more of the value those sources can
provide.5 Analogously, we might think that while it is valuable to satisfy
the evidential norms, one can rationally opt to violate them in order to
obtain more accuracy. Let’s see how we might make this precise.
Evidence constrains our credences. For instance, according to Principal
Principle, knowing that the chance of X is r (and nothing more) constrains
an agent to have c(X) = r. Thus, let us represent a body of evidence by
the set of credence functions that count as responding properly to that evi-
dence. So we represent the evidence provided by knowing that the chance
of X is r (and nothing more) by the following set:
E = {c : c(X) = r}
With this representation in hand, we might make the evidential goal of cre-
dences precise by saying that is it a goal of a credal state to lie in the set
E of credence functions that respond properly to the available evidence.
And we might say that the goodness of a credence function is determined
at least in part by its proximity to that goal. How might we measure that
proximity? Using the standard mathematical definition of the distance be-
tween a point and a set of points, we might naturally define:6
E(c, E) := inf{Q(c, c′) : c′ ∈ E}
where Q is Squared Euclidean Distance, as defined on page 3. And we
might say that E(c, E) is the distance from c to the evidential goal and
−E(c, E) is its proximity to that goal.
We might then say that the overall cognitive value of a credence func-
tion c at a world w inWF and in the presence of evidence E is:
C(c, E , w) := −B(c, w)− E(c, E)
That is, it is the sum of its proximity to the alethic goal of credences—that is,
matching the omniscient credences—and its proximity to the evidential goal
of credences—that is, responding properly to the evidence.
5Not all consequentialist views have this feature. Indeed, many can replicate the deon-
tic consequences of a ‘side constraints’ view such as Nozick’s. See [Brown, 2011] for the
strengths and limitations of this ‘consequentializing’ strategy.
6The infimum of a set of real numbers S (written inf S) is the greatest lower bound on S.
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Consider Taj again. This is the case that poses problems for Joyce’s
argument. Taj’s credence function is c(X) = 0.6, c(¬X) = 0.6; and she
knows that the chance of X is 0.6. So
E = {c : c(X) = 0.6}
Now, let c∗(X) = 0.5, c∗(¬X) = 0.5. Then it is straightforward to calculate
C w1 w2
c -0.52 -0.52
c∗ -0.51 -0.51
Thus, c∗ dominates c relative to C. Moreover, c∗ is not itself even weakly
dominated by any other credence function. Thus, on this account, c is in-
deed rendered irrational by Dominance, as Joyce requires.
However, this victory is short-lived. Consider the credence function
c1(X) = 0.8, c1(¬X) = 0. It clearly violates Probabilism, yet it is not
dominated by any other credence function: it is, in fact, the credence func-
tion for which C(·, E , w1) achieves its maximum. Similarly, c2(X) = 0.6,
c2(¬X) = 1 is the credence function for which C(·, E , w2) achieves its maxi-
mum. Thus, c1 and c2 are not dominated. So, while we might appeal to C to
provide a response to Easwaran and Fitelson’s chosen example, it will not
take us any further. Thus, on this version of the Competing Virtues View,
Joyce’s argument fails.
Of course, this is not the only way to make the Competing Virtues View
precise. We could combine the evidential value−E(c, E) of a credence func-
tion c with its accuracy −B(c, w) in some way other than by adding them
together. We could take a weighted sum or some other binary function;
or, we could alter our measure of proximity to the evidential goal. It turns
out that opting for a weighted sum will not help (providing one gives at
least some weight to both−B and−E): there will always be incoherent cre-
dence functions that are not dominated relative to such an overall cognitive
value function. Perhaps another alternative will help. But she who defends
Joyce’s argument in this way will have to motivate that alternative on in-
dependent grounds; moreover, she must argue that the way of combining
−B and −E considered in this section—that is, taking their straight sum or
taking a weighted sum—is impermissible as an overall cognitive value func-
tion; it is not sufficient to show merely that some other way of combining
those two functions is permissible.
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5 The Incomparable Virtues View
The Incomparable Virtues View shares much in common with the Com-
peting Virtues View.7 On both, we have (i) a measure B of the distance of
a credence function from the goal of accuracy, and thus −B as a measure
of one sort of value that a credence function can have; and (ii) we have
a measure E of the distance of that credence function from the evidential
goal, and thus −E as a measure of a different sort of value that a credence
function can have. On the Competing Virtues View, we can combine −B
and −E to give an overall cognitive value function because, while they are
measures of different sorts of values, they are nonetheless comparable. On
the Incomparable Virtues View, on the other hand, there is no way of com-
bining −B and −E to give an overall value function: on this view, they
measure different and, moreover, incomparable values. This is analogous
to a position in ethics that measures the goodness of an outcome for each
individual in exactly the way that utilitarianism does (that is, by using that
agent’s own hedonistic utility function); but which denies that the outcome
can be assigned an overall value by summing (or in some other way com-
bining) the values it has for each individual.
The problem with such a view in ethics or in epistemology is to say how
it constrains what we ought to do. If there is no way of weighing one good
against another, we can’t always compare all options with respect to overall
goodness. Of course, that’s not to say that we can’t sometimes compare
some options. For instance, if c∗ is closer than c to both the evidential goal
and the goal of accuracy at all worlds, then c∗ is to be preferred to c. But
the ordering of credence functions that this gives is typically very far from
being complete. How are we to adjudicate between two credence functions
that are not ordered by this condition?
The orthodox answer—which dates at least to [Good, 1952], and which
is endorsed by [Weirich, 2004, §4.4]—is this:
Caprice An option is irrational if it is ruled out as irrational
relative to every way of combining the two incomparable utility
functions to give an overall value function.8
The idea behind Caprice is this: What is irrational is that which one has
positive reason not to do.
7I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for pushing me to consider this
account of the relationship between evidence and accuracy.
8Weirich calls this ‘Quantization’. ‘Caprice’ is the name given by [Weatherson, ms] to
the analogous rule for decision-makers with indeterminate (or imprecise) probabilities.
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This is a very permissive norm. Indeed, as those who endorse it are
aware, it must be made stricter if it is to be used at different times ([Weirich, 2004],
[Weatherson, ms]). For our purposes, however, we can use the simpler
norm as it is stated above. So stated, Caprice is so permissive that it blocks
Joyce’s argument. After all, as we saw in §4, there is a way of combining
−B and−E to give an overall cognitive value function—e.g. by summing—
such that there are incoherent credence functions that are not ruled out as
irrational relative to this value function. Thus, on the Incomparable Virtues
View, Joyce’s argument for Probabilism is blocked.
6 The Reductive View
We have been considering the following objection to Joyce’s argument for
Probabilism: Joyce’s argument assumes that the only goal of a credal state
is accuracy; but there is at least one other goal, namely, matching the evi-
dence. That is, Joyce’s argument assumes a version of credal virtue monism.
It is the version that Goldman calls ‘veritism’ [Goldman, 2001]. In that pa-
per, Goldman defends the position by objecting to rival accounts of the
relationship between alethic and evidential virtues. In this section, I wish
to defend the monism required for Joyce’s argument rather differently.
The major stumbling block for this version of credal value monism is
that there seem to be evidential norms; and their force seems to stem from
the evidential goals at which they demand that we aim. There are two ways
to overcome this obstacle: on the first, we give an error theory of evidential
norms and explain why we mistakenly think they hold; on the second, we
agree that the evidential norms hold, but we show that they follow from the
goal of accuracy alone, not from a distinct evidential goal. I will take the
latter route. I call this the Reductive View. It is analogous to those versions
of utilitarianism that insist that only utility is valuable, but try to recover
some of the Kantian or rights-based norms by showing that, in the long
run, actions that violate them have lower total utility.
My strategy is this: Recall the form of Joyce’s argument for Probabil-
ism as I presented it above. It has two components: the first is the claim
that the measure of accuracy—namely, the negative Brier score—measures
cognitive value; the second is a decision-theoretic norm, namely, Domi-
nance. From these, via a mathematical theorem, Joyce derives Probabil-
ism. I claim that any evidential norm can be derived in the same manner.
We retain the first component, namely, the identification of cognitive value
with accuracy—this is the core of veritism. But we change the decision-
theoretic norm. Different decision-theoretic norms give rise to different
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credal norms, some of which are the evidential norms we wish to recover.
Consider, for instance, the decision-theoretic norm of Maximin:
Maximin We say
(c) o worst-case dominates o′ with respect to U if the minimum util-
ity of o is greater than the minimum utility of o′. That is,
min{U(o′, w) : w ∈ W} < min{U(o, w) : w ∈ W}
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o worst-case dominates o′;
(ii) There is no o′′ in O such that o′′ worst-case dominates o.
Then o′ is irrational.
Thus, roughly, an option o is irrational if there is another option o′ whose
minimum value is greater than the minimum value of o. That is, Maximin
asks us to look at the worst-case scenario for each option and pick one of
those whose worst-case scenario is best. Then, as shown in [Pettigrew, ms],
when this norm is applied to the negative Brier score measure of cognitive
value, we can derive the Principle of Indifference:
Principle of Indifference Suppose F is finite. Then, in the ab-
sence of evidence, the agent ought to have the uniform distri-
bution over F as her credence function.
That is, in the absence of evidence, each possible world ought to be as-
signed the same credence.
Next, consider the following norm:
Chance Dominance Suppose C = {ch1, . . . , chn} is the set of
possible chance functions. We say
(d) o chance dominates o′ with respect to U if the objective ex-
pected utility of o is greater than the objective expected utility
of o′ relative to any chance function in C. That is,
∑
w∈W
chi(w)U(o, w) > ∑
w∈W
chi(w)U(o′, w)
for all chi in C.
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
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(i) o chance dominates o′ with respect to U;
(ii) There is no o′′ in O such that o′′ chance dominates o.
Then o′ is irrational.
Thus, roughly, if every possible chance function expects option o to be bet-
ter than it expects option o′ to be, then o′ is irrational. Then, as shown in
[Pettigrew, 2013], when this norm is applied to the negative Brier score, we
derive something close to Lewis’ version of the Principal Principle:
Principal Principle In the absence of evidence, an agent ought
to have a credence function c such that
c(X | E & the objective chances are given by chi) = chi(X|E)
This allows us to identify what is really wrong with Taj. It is not that her cre-
dence function c is dominated by credence functions such as c∗ that are not
themselves dominated. It is rather that there is another credence function—
in fact, it is c′—such that the only possible chance function expects c to be
more inaccurate than it expects c to be.9
Finally, consider the most familiar decision-theoretic norm:
Maximize Subjective Expected Utility Suppose our agent has
probabilistic credence function c. We say
(e) c expects o to have higher utility than it expects o′ to have with
respect to U if
∑
w∈W
c(w)U(o, w) > ∑
w∈W
c(w)U(o′, w)
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) c expects o to have higher utility than it expects o′ to have
with respect to U;
(ii) There is no o′′ in O such that c expects o′′ to have higher
utility than it expects o to have with respect to U.
Then o′ is irrational.
9In unpublished work, Joyce also endorses the diagnosis of Taj’s cognitive failing given
in [Pettigrew, 2013]—cf. [Joyce, ms].
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Thus, roughly, an option o′ is irrational if there is another option o that
one’s own probabilistic credence function expects to have higher utility
than it expects o′ to have. We will use this to establish a norm that governs
not credences, but updating rules for credences—that is, rules that take an
agent’s current credence function and a new piece of evidence and return
the posterior credence function the agent ought to have if she learns only
that evidence. Thus, we need to adapt our measure of cognitive value for
credence functions to give a measure of cognitive value for updating rules.
But that is easily done. Suppose our agent knows that she will receive ev-
idence from the partition E = {E1, . . . , En}. Then, for each world, there
is a unique piece of evidence she might obtain. Then the cognitive value
of an updating rule at a given world is the cognitive value, at that world,
of the credence function to which the updating rule would give rise if the
agent were to learn the unique piece of evidence that she will obtain at that
world. With this in hand, it is shown in [Oddie, 1997]—and, more fully,
in [Greaves and Wallace, 2006]—that this decision-theoretic norm together
with this measure of cognitive value for updating rules entails Condition-
alization:
Conditionalization If the agent has credence function c and
knows she is about to receive evidence from the partition E =
{E1, . . . , En}, then she ought to plan to have credence function
c(·|Ei) upon receipt of evidence Ei.
The Principle of Indifference, the Principal Principle, and Condition-
alization are three of the most important and widely used evidential norms
for credences. The results just cited show that they follow from the goal of
accuracy. There is no need to appeal to a distinct goal of matching the ev-
idence. As we might hope, by pursuing the goal of accuracy properly and
in line with the decision-theoretic norms just stated, we thereby satisfy the
evidential norms that are often cited in favour of a pluralistic view of epis-
temic virtue.10
Thus, on the Reductive View, there are evidential norms. But this doesn’t
show that credences aim to match the evidence. Rather, they aim to match
10It might be objected that the decision-theoretic norms Maximin and Maximize Subjec-
tive Expected Utility are in tension: for certain choices, they will jointly rule out all options
as irrational. But note that they are deployed here in different contexts: Maximin is used at
the beginning of an agent’s epistemic life, before she has set her credences—indeed, Max-
imin is what she uses to set those initial credences; Maximize Subjective Expected Utility
is used after that—once the agent has a credence function in place—in order to fix her
updating policy. For a discussion of the possible tension between Maximin and Chance
Dominance, see [Pettigrew, ms, §6.3].
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the omniscient credal state. But, that very goal, together with standard
norms that govern decisions between options, entails the evidential norms.
On the picture I have been sketching, Joyce’s argument for Probabil-
ism is fundamental. After all, Dominance is the weakest decision-theoretic
norm of all: Maximin, Chance Dominance, and Maximize Subjective Ex-
pected Utility all entail Dominance. Thus, any other norm we apply will
entail a norm that is itself stronger than Probabilism. Probabilism is the
norm that can be deduced from any application of decision theory in the
theory of credences. Thus, on the Reductive View, Joyce’s argument for
that norm is safe.
7 Conclusion
In sum: on the Side Constraints View and on the Competing Virtues View
of evidential norms, Joyce’s argument for Probabilism is blocked. How-
ever, on the Reductive View it succeeds. All that remains is to say which
view is correct.
I endorse the Reductive View. Of course, what I presented above is not
itself an argument for that view. I have shown that three major evidential
norms follow from the goal of accuracy. But that does not rule out the
possibility that there is also an evidential goal that gives rise to the same
norms. That is, it might be that the evidential norms are overdetermined:
they follow from the evidential goal and from the alethic goal. Yet, in the
light of the considerations above, parsimony tells in favour of veritism. The
above arguments remove the motivation for positing an evidential goal as
well as an alethic goal; and parsimony demands that we not multiply credal
virtues unnecessarily.
As well as parsimony, these arguments endow veritism with explana-
tory power. To explain evidential norms by positing an evidential goal
for credences is akin to explaining the soporific effect of opium by posit-
ing a ‘dormitive virtue’, whereas there is considerable explanatory power
in a theory that derives evidential norms directly from alethic goals. If we
adapt Joyce’s style of argument by replacing Dominance by other decision-
theoretic norms, such as Maximin, Chance Dominance, and Maximize
Subjective Expected Utility, we have such a theory.
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